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Viewing cable 08BEIRUT701, LEBANON: SAMIR GEAGEA GOING TO DOHA, NO TO 10-10-10

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#08BEIRUT701**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08BEIRUT701	2008-05-15 22:06	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Beirut

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11352>
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<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11627>
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1906
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000701

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA

ALSO FOR A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018

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SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAMIR GEAGEA GOING TO DOHA, NO TO 10-10-10

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY

1. (C) In a late night, Thursday, May 15 meeting, Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea told Charge that he is concerned that deals are being made under the table at this time with regards to the next Lebanese government and that Sa'ad Hariri is wavering on the March 14 agenda. Geagea specifically asked that Washington telephone the Saudis and Sa'ad to shore up support for the March 14 agenda. Geagea said that March 14 will not accept a 10-10-10 Cabinet or anything that allows Hizballah to exercise a veto over Cabinet decisions. Geagea thinks the time is right to seek a United Nations Security Council Resolution warning all sides that any future use of arms to change the political landscape will result in Security Council action.

2. (C) Charge, accompanied by Defense Attach, met with Samir Geagea at his party headquarters in Maarab on May 15.

WASHINGTON MUST CALL THE SAUDIS
TELL THEM TO GIVE SA'AD SOME STRENGTH

3. (C) Geagea was quick to tell us that Walid Jumblatt should not go to Doha, as Geagea is certain Walid is cutting deals behind everyone's back. Geagea also had the impression that Sa'ad Hariri also was in deal-making mode to become Prime Minister. Geagea said he called Sa'ad's advisor, Ghattas Khoury, earlier in the evening to let him know that if there was a deal being made under the table, the Lebanese Forces would be "completely out of the coalition."

4. (C) Fearing these deals, Geagea insisted that Washington telephone the Saudis soonest to impress upon them the need for Sa'ad to stand firm in Doha and to not compromise March 14 political and moral high ground by taking some sort of deal. According to Geagea, the Saudis need to understand that the Lebanese Forces will not accept any deal that has a 10-10-10 formula or a veto for Hizballah. Geagea thinks that all of the other March 14 leaders, such as PM Siniora and the Christian leaders, are holding strong in the face of the deal makers. Meanwhile, Geagea assesses that Sa'ad is "waffling" and Jumblatt is "fearful," so they are running for the door. "We are standing on the red line," quipped Geagea. "Hizballah has lost more than it gained by this. We must maintain our political ground since they attacked Lebanese people," said Geagea.

THE WRANGLING OVER THE DOHA AGENDA
HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION

5. (C) Throughout the day today, the Doha agenda for Friday, May 16, was in flux. There was much wrangling over adjectives and verbs that created slightly different nuanced meanings. In all cases, it was very clear that Hizballah was doing anything it could to keep its weapons off the agenda. At one point, Hizballah insisted that the clause discussing weapons be decoupled from a clause about the National Unity Government. This, according to Geagea, was an attempt to put the issue of weapons at a lower priority on the agenda. At the end of the day, March 14 insisted on, and achieved, a final clause that stated that all of the clauses on the agenda held equal status for discussion. Based on this, Geagea is confident that Hizballah's weapons, and their use during the past week, will make it onto the table in Doha.

NO DISCUSSION OF PORTFOLIOS
THE ARMY SHOULD TAKE CARE

¶16. (C) Geagea believes the agenda at Doha is already full and that no other matters will make it onto the table. Geagea will leave for Doha on the afternoon of May 16 as a guest of the Qataris, as will all of the other delegates. Geagea said that none of the "sovereign ministry" portfolios of Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice or Defense would be discussed at Doha.

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¶17. (C) Turning to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Geagea recommended that the LAF move any ammunition or equipment stored in Hizballah-controlled areas. Defense Attach assured Geagea that the LAF was already taking measures to secure its weapons as it always does. In a pointed attack on LAF G-2 (military intelligence) Georges Khoury, Geagea warned the USG not to give any "listening equipment" to Khoury, as he would use this against the Lebanese Forces. (Comment: We have heard this same refrain from Geagea many times before. End Comment.)

¶18. (C) Geagea assesses that the LAF is having a difficult time after the events of last week. Geagea told us that he has information that LAF officers are working with civilian "zealots" to establish &community watch8 type organizations that have weapons. Geagea said these officers were doing this in order to prepare for another period of unrest like was seen this week with Hizballah.

NOW IS THE TIME FOR A UN RESOLUTION
SEND A SIGNAL TO ALL THE PARTIES

¶19. (C) Geagea told Charge that he met with the French Charge d'Affaires, Andre Parent, two days ago, as well as the Greek and Italian Ambassadors today, to discuss a new U.N. Security Council resolution. Specifically, Geagea thinks the time is ripe to publish a resolution that has some teeth (i.e., a Chapter VII resolution). While all of the Ambassadors agreed with him about Hizballah's final goals, they have concerns since they have troops that are members of UNIFIL in the south and any hasty moves could put their troops at risk.

¶10. (C) Acknowledging their positions, Geagea said that "the weakest link, Syria, should be the target of a new UNSCR." Geagea thinks that a security council resolution should threaten action in a non-specific way by saying that the Security Council would "take measures" if Hizballah conducted any actions using its weapons in the future. At the same time, Geagea wants someone to go to Syria and deliver the message that the "certain measures" would be an air embargo of Syria.
SISON